



Experiencing a Campus Active Shooter

Lessons learned from an active shooter event at Arkansas State University - Jonesboro

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March 8, 2018





Arkansas State University

- Located Jonesboro, AR, 75,515 population, rural community 70 miles northwest of Memphis, TN
- Student headcount 14,125 Fall 2017; 9,780 FTE
- Faculty / staff 1,430 FTE
- Facilities Management staff 173 FTE
- 158 building, 4.2 million GSF
- 1,077 acres, 573 maintained acres
- Master's research institution
- Division I athletics, Sun Belt Conference, Red Wolves mascot





Event Summary

- Thursday December 10, 2015, 1:25 PM A male drives a pickup into to Arkansas State University campus, around barricades, onto sidewalks, eventually drives circles and stops on the east Student Union lawn. He gets out of truck wielding a shotgun, instructing nearby students to leave the area.
- Located visibly in bed of truck is 5 gallons of gasoline and 100 lb. propane tank.
- Emergency 911 calls first received around 1:30 PM, campus lockdown issued at approximately 1:32 PM.
- https://youtu.be/otlnxisiY A






Event Summary Cont.

- This was second day of Fall 2015 Final Exams, students were in classes, in Student Union, residence halls, and other areas of campus.
- Suspect peacefully surrendered and was apprehended approximately at 3:15 PM, no shots fired.
- Campus lockdown lifted around 4:00 PM.






























General Lessons Learned – What Went Right

- FEMA Virtual Table Top Exercise on Active Shooter scenario was occurring in Student Union at time of incident. UPD and other EOC staff response was instantaneous.
- Local law enforcement responded and secured the area within 15 minutes of 911 call (approximately 40-50 responders beside UPD staff)





General Lessons Learned - What Went Right (cont.)

- Mass notifications (loud speaker address from Library tower, building speaker address, campus text messages, social media, desk phone alerts, email alerts) activated within 3 minutes of incident.
- Physical lock down and shelter in place began immediately following the mass notification (trained students, staff and faculty)
- Campus road closure was generally successful within 20 minutes.





General Lessons Learned - What Went Right (cont.)

- Frequent communications occurred from AState text and social media to advise people sheltering in place and concerned persons off campus.
- Most buildings adjacent to the incident evacuated calmly and quickly.
- Most support personnel instinctively responded by directing students / staff / faculty to safe areas or building evacuation routes.
- Responders were very prepared.
- Freshmen and Sophomore Active Shooter Training well prepared students.





General Lessons Learned – What Went Poorly

- Emergency Operations Command (EOC) was not centralized. Communications occurred via phone and radio instead of face-to-face. This created delays and some confusion of responsibilities.
- Some off-duty law enforcement responded in plain clothes, or in non-enforcement vehicles bearing tactical weapons and clothing (friend or foe?)
- It was initially unclear which buildings should evacuate and which should shelter in place.
- Mass notification via speakers / PA systems was not clear to everyone.





General Lessons Learned - What Went Poorly (cont.)

- Misinformation from social media generated by students / staff was re-communicated by news media, reports of shots fired.
- Access control system took 15-20 minutes to activated electronic locks following campus lock down order
 - Delay of activation since primary system manager was not on campus.
- Faculty not required to have Active Shooter training, students lead barricade / shelter in place activities.
- FM staff was initially asked to manage road entrances, was not clear if they had authority to restrict access to campus (responders, press, parents).





General Lessons Learned – What Went Poorly (cont.)

- FM staff was expected to lock exterior and interior doors.
 - FM staff were not present in all buildings at time of incident
 - Exterior doors with panic bars generally require a special tool / key to lock
 - FM staff did not understand role prior to event to be secondary first responders
 - Many staff do not carry keys
 - Some were unwilling to lock exterior doors in fear of being a potential target
- Most students / faculty / staff do not understand ordinate directions for evacuation and incident avoidance.
- On campus daycare facility had parents walking to campus to pick up children during campus lock down.





Lessons learned for Facilities Management – Staffing

- FM Staff need annual training on Active Shooter response, from a support perspective.
- FM Staff need access to keys and panic bar tools to secure manual locking exterior doors.
- EOC chain of command awareness is essential for FM communications and providing directions.
- FM staff should clearly understand roles and functions in a lock-down scenario.





Lessons learned for Facilities Management – Site & Building Exterior Design

 Most of existing buildings and areas are vulnerable to vehicle access. More barriers will be placed to deter and minimize full-sized vehicle access.















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- Minimize or eliminate store front / window walls at ground level. Buffer the window access from exterior with site features.

























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- Liberal quantities of security cameras
































Lessons learned for Facilities Management – Building Interiors & Classrooms


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































Where possible, door side lights should not be on latch side of door.






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- Interior glass walls and windows adjacent to hallways and other public spaces creates occupant vulnerability in lockdown / shelter in-place situations.
 - In existing buildings, interior glass and exterior glass can be obscured to limit visibility in the spaces.
- Open hallways is desired for quickly identifying threats, speed of egress, and visibility for responders.











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- Open hallways is desired for quickly identifying threats, speed of egress, and visibility for responders.
- Easily locked interior rooms is critical, documented to have saved lives at Virginia Tech, Columbine, Sandy Hook, and Stoneman-Douglas. BE SURE YOU SELECT A FUNCTIONAL LOCK!!!







This cylindrical lock is an ANSI F110 function "Classroom Intruder".

Why does this not work for college / university classrooms?

AState proposed learning space passage set standards are ANSI F95 Interconnecting Single Lock or F13 Corridor Mortise.





INTERCONNECTED LEVERSET
















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Thank You!! Questions?

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